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1. Introduction
Language is a matter of interpretation, and interpretations will differ. This fact is of fundamental importance in the
construction of contracts, which are written or verbal agreements that the parties should act in particular ways under
particular conditions. For any contract to be successfully implemented, the parties must agree on whether the relevant
conditions apply. If parties may differ in their interpretation of the conditions that apply including the actions that are
required, contracts will lead to disputes and, ultimately, litigation.
To avoid disputes, parties to a contract may seek to avoid terms likely to give rise to dispute, even when the result-
ing contract is incomplete, in the sense that opportunities for risk-sharing or productive cooperation are foregone. They
might also include default clauses like liquidated damages in order to avoid further litigation fees incurred during ex post
arguments over contractual terms.
In ordinary usage, we use the term ‘ambiguous’ to describe language that is open to multiple interpretations. The con-
verse term ‘unambiguous’ is used when language is clear, and its meaning is agreed by all. Linguistic ambiguity may be
either ‘syntactic’, when the same sequence of words may be interpreted in different ways, or ‘semantic’, when individual
words have more than one meaning.
In formal decision theory, the term ‘ambiguity’ has a distinct technical meaning, applicable in the case when individ-
ual decision makers are unable to attach a unique probability distribution over the state space. We will refer to this as
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the effects of linguistic ambiguity closely resemble those appearing in the probabilistic ambiguity literature (in particular,
Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014).
We think of the ambiguity that parties to a contract face as arising from the potentially different interpretations of the
contingencies speciﬁed in the contract. Grant et al. (2012a) examined the implications of contractual ambiguity in bargaining
problems, and showed that ambiguity may lead to incomplete risk sharing.
In the present paper, we consider the contractual speciﬁcation of damages that apply when one party is unable (or
ﬁnds it undesirable) to fulﬁll their contractual obligations. In this context, we consider ‘liquidated damages’ contracts which
specify a constant payment for the case of default. We show in Proposition 1 that liquidated damages contracts are ex
ante eﬃcient when the aversion to ambiguity is suﬃciently high. It is natural to ask, however, whether the eﬃciency of
liquidated damages contracts obtains in the standard state-space approach. We show in Proposition 2 that it does not.
Eﬃciency arguments for liquidated damages clauses appear in the economics literature as far back as Shavell (1980),
and are elaborated in Che and Chung (1999). The eﬃciency is obtained by considering effects on the ex ante investment
and default incentives of the parties. These papers model risk neutral parties in the absence of ambiguity, so there is no
contractual rationale for risk sharing or ambiguity aversion. Chung (1991) pointed out the diﬃculty of simple contracts
being eﬃcient when both parties are risk averse.
In contrast we consider risk averse and ambiguity averse parties. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that liquidated damages contracts
can be eﬃcient when coupled with ambiguity aversion. The source for the eﬃciency of liquidated damages is their security
against ex post disputes.
Our result is based on an intuition similar to that of Mukerji and Tallon (2001) who demonstrated how probabilistic
ambiguity about the idiosyncratic risk associated with ﬁnancial assets may deter agents from trading such assets. In their
model, however, disagreement between ambiguity averse parties arises after the signing of a contract, but before the real-
ization of the state of nature, as each party evaluates their position according to the least favorable of a set of priors. There,
ambiguity is expressed in terms of multiple priors. In our model, disagreement arises after the realization of the state of
nature, when the parties are in dispute over what action is required by the contract. Here, ambiguity is expressed in terms
of multiple interpretations. Given the way we formalize the linguistic ambiguity in our model, however, mathematically the
mechanisms in both papers operate quite similarly with ambiguity inhibiting each party’s willingness to contract or to adopt
a contract with incomplete risk sharing.
Motivations for liquidated damages that are more in line with our approach appear in the legal literature. As argued by
Hillman (2000, p. 732):
Because people do not like ambiguity, contracting parties may prefer the safety of a liquidated damages provision over
the uncertainty of expectancy damages.
Similarly, Goetz and Scott (1977, p. 557) explain:
The expected cost of establishing true losses under conventional damage measures will thus induce parties who face
uncertain or unprovable anticipated losses to negotiate stipulated damage agreements.
The eﬃciency of liquidated damages contracts in our model rests on the aversion to ambiguity being suﬃciently pro-
nounced to induce the parties to forgo risk sharing opportunities in default states. In general, however, eﬃcient contracts
exploit risk sharing opportunities in non-default states.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a formal model of contracting in the presence of linguistic
ambiguity. Following Grant et al. (2012a), we adopt a convenient subclass of Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2014) expected uncertain
utility theory to model the way the parties evaluate such contracts. We then illustrate, with reference to the idea of liquidated
damages, how suﬃcient aversion to linguistic ambiguity can lead the parties to prefer incomplete risk sharing to ambiguous
contracts. We conclude with a brief discussion about how the representation of ambiguity developed in this paper suggests
new approaches to further applications in contract theory and agency theory.
2. Contracts, linguistic ambiguity and preferences
Recall from the introduction, a contract is a written or verbal agreement entered into by the parties to the contract
which speciﬁes the actions to be taken under various conditions. Formally, we follow the approach developed in Grant et al.
(2012a) by modeling this as a ﬁnite state space S describing all possible conditions that can be articulated in the common
language used by the two parties, and an action space A that describes all actions that the parties can agree to take. Thus
we identify a contract c by a mapping from S to A.1 Let C denote the set of contracts.
While the language and hence corresponding state space S are common, the parties to a contract may disagree ex post
over which contractual terms have been satisﬁed and thus which actions are required by the contract.
1 Linguistic ambiguity is developed more fully in Grant et al. (2012b) where a contract is explicitly speciﬁed in a (formal) language. From the formal
language we derive the state space S and, for each contract, the associated mapping from S to A.
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is s. Individuals can recognize that certain conditions are ambiguous, and may be interpreted differently by the other party,
so that, in the given circumstances, the other party might conclude that the actual state is s′ ( = s). We model this by
specifying, for each state s a ‘dispute set’ D(s) ⊂ S that is assumed to contain s. The interpretation of D(s) is that when a
player believes s has obtained, she thinks the other player could have assessed any state s′ in D(s) as having obtained.
Clearly, if D(s) = {s}, the players will agree on the occurrence of state s, and the requirement for the action c(s). Thus,
the language available to the players unambiguously speciﬁes state s. More generally, we say an event E ⊂ S is unambiguous
if E = ⋃s∈E D(s). Grant et al. (2012a, Lemma 1) showed that the set of unambiguous events EU is an algebra of subsets
of S , that is, EU contains S , and is closed under taking complements and ﬁnite intersections.
Notice that if a contract speciﬁes the same action for every element of an unambiguous event E , then the fact that the
players disagree about which element of E has occurred does not matter. Thus we say a contract c is unambiguous if it is
measurable with respect to EU . For ambiguous contracts, however, when party i believes that the state is s, she considers
it possible that the other party believes any element of D(s) has obtained. The ambiguity here is all expressed in terms of
dispute sets and due to multiple interpretations.
Turning to preferences, we ﬁrst posit an outcome function yi : A × S → R, for each i = 1,2, where we interpret
yi(a, s) as the ‘wealth equivalent’ outcome for party i when action a from A is undertaken and she observes s in S .
We assume that individuals anticipate that a dispute will lead to a ‘war-of-attrition’ game in which each party’s equilib-
rium payoff is equal to her security payoff, in this case, the outcome associated with the other player’s interpretation.2 That
is, if party i sees state s when the other party sees s′ then unless the other party prefers party i’s interpretation to his own,
the (certainty-equivalent) outcome in the war-of-attrition equilibrium for party i is yi(c(s′), s). Hence in terms of a given
contract c, this possibility of dispute generates ambiguity about the action that will actually be implemented. Depending
upon which interpretation is followed, the outcome might conceivably be any member of the set {yi(c(s′), s): s′ ∈ D(s)}.
Following the approach developed in Grant et al. (2012a), we adopt a special case of Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2014) class
of expected uncertain utility maximizers to model the way the parties evaluate contracts subject to linguistic ambiguity that
may result in potential loss arising from a dispute and the resulting war of attrition. This leads party i to evaluate a contract
c according to the function:
Vi(c) =
∑
s∈S
πs
[
αi min
s′∈D(s)
vi
(
yi
(
c
(
s′
)
, s
))+ (1− αi) max
s′∈D(s)
vi
(
yi
(
c
(
s′
)
, s
))]
, (1)
where π ∈R|S|+ satisfying
∑
s∈S πs = 1, is the (common) prior probability over S , vi(·) is her preference scaling function that
encodes her attitudes toward risk, and αi ∈ [0,1] is interpreted as a measure of her (relative) aversion toward ambiguity as
it is the weight attached to the worst possibility in the dispute set.3
A contract c is ex ante eﬃcient if there is no other contract c′ such that Vi(c′) Vi(c) for i = 1,2, with a strict inequality
for some i.
Depending on the degree of concavity of the preference scaling functions vi(·) compared to the decision-weight ambi-
guity aversion parameter αi , the ambiguity may lead the parties to prefer incomplete risk sharing to possibly ambiguous
contracts. This point can be illustrated with reference to the idea of liquidated damages.
3. Liquidated damages
To be effective, a contract must specify some sanction to be applied if one or other party fails to perform their obliga-
tions. In some cases, this is a relatively simple matter: failure to perform may be held to nullify the contract. In other cases,
however, failure by one party to perform an obligation may cause damage to the other.
For concreteness, let us consider an example where a supplier contracts with a builder to deliver materials on a given
date. However, under certain conditions, the supplier may be unable to deliver, and so may default, declaring force majeure.
Failure to deliver on time may force the builder to source the supplies elsewhere at high cost, or to delay the project. Thus,
neither nullifying the contract nor requiring (delayed) performance is an adequate remedy. The costs of failure will depend
on a variety of factors. For example, rainy weather might halt construction with the result that the supplier’s default causes
no additional cost. In other cases, the default may occur at a crucial point in the project, creating unusually large damages.
In the absence of bounds on rationality, the parties could agree on a contract that listed all conceivable default states,
and specify a payment to be made in each case. Any Pareto optimal bargaining solution in this case, derived from the
state-dependent preferences of both parties, will be referred to as the ﬁrst best. However, with ambiguity arising from
bounded rationality, the ﬁrst best may not be attainable.
One solution is for the contract to specify that the defaulting party should compensate the other party to an amount
depending on the amount of their loss. In the event of a dispute over the magnitude of the loss, a court or other external
arbiter will determine the payment.
2 We thank Roger Myerson for the suggestion that disputes can be modeled as wars of attrition.
3 We show in Appendix A the way in which the representation in Eq. (1) arises from preferences that come from the class of expected-uncertain-utility
decision-makers.
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without reference to the actual losses suffered by the injured party. We will look at the liquidated damages setting and give
some results on when liquidated damages contracts are eﬃcient.
We begin by assuming that S = Ω × {0,1} where the Ed = Ω × {1} is interpreted as ‘the situation is such that party 1
must default’, and D(s) = {s} for all s /∈ Ed , that is, there is no ambiguity outside default. Potential disputes relate to the
consequences of default, and not to the question of whether party 1 has in fact defaulted.
The action set A = Aˆ × T is the Cartesian product of a set of actions Aˆ relevant to the performance of the contract and a
set of payment actions (monetary transfers) T = [−M,M]. The set Aˆ is assumed to include a default action a0. Actions t ∈ T
are interpreted as ‘party 1 pays t dollars to party 2’. Actions aˆ ∈ Aˆ − {ao} are prohibitively costly to party 1 in the event of
default. Thus, we restrict attention to contracts that satisfy:
c(s) =
{
(ac(s), tc(s)) if s /∈ Ed
(a0, tc(s)) if s ∈ Ed.
That is, the contract speciﬁes a set of actions to be performed, and payments to be made, in the absence of default and
a set of payments to be made in the presence of default. The payment tc(ω,1) for any ω ∈ Ω (that is, a payment made in
the presence of default) is referred to as a damages payment.
We further assume that, for each party i = 1,2 in each state s ∈ S , the preferences over (aˆ, y) are quasi-linear with
respect to monetary transfers and so the wealth equivalent outcome in each state may be expressed in the form
yi
(
(aˆ, t), s
)= wi(aˆ, s) + (−1)i × t,
where wi(aˆ, s) is the monetary equivalent value to party i of the action aˆ performed in state s.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that the preference scaling function vi is strictly increasing (v ′i > 0) and
strictly concave (v ′′i < 0), and that there is a common prior on S that we denote by π .
Notice that for any default state s = (ω,1) ∈ Ed , (ω,0) is the state that would have obtained if party 1 had not de-
faulted. In this counter-factual state, the contract would have called for action ac(ω,0). Hence, for each s = (ω,1) ∈ Ed ,
w2(ac(ω,0), s) − w2(a0, s) may be interpreted as the loss incurred by party 2 in state s, as a consequence of the default by
party 1.
In the absence of ambiguity, a Pareto optimal contract c∗ must satisfy the Borch condition for eﬃcient risk-sharing, that
is, the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of state-contingent payoffs must be the same for both individuals.
Formally, for any pair of default states s, s′ ∈ Ed .
πs v ′1(w1(a0, s) − tc∗(s))
πs′ v ′1(w1(a0, s′) − tc∗(s′))
= πs v
′
2(w2(a0, s) + tc∗(s))
πs′ v ′2(w2(a0, s′) + tc∗(s′))
A contract satisfying this condition will be referred to as a ﬁrst-best contract. Since the contract is unambiguous in the
absence of default, the ﬁrst-best contract will be unambiguous if (and only if): for any pair of default states s, s′ ∈ Ed and
any party i ∈ {1,2}, s′ ∈ D(s) implies wi(a0, s) = wi(a0, s′).
Suppose, however, that the conditions relevant to the effects of default on the welfare of party 1 (the defaulting party)
are ambiguous. In this case, we might instead consider the case of a contract with damages dependent on losses to party 2.
Since the cardinality of Ed is ﬁnite it follows that the set
L2 =
{
 ∈ [0,M]: ∃ω ∈ Ω s.t.  = w2
(
ac(ω,0), (ω,1)
)− w2(a0, (ω,1))}
is also ﬁnite. Moreover, for each  ∈ L2, there exists an event E ⊂ S that obtains if and only if default occurs and the
associated loss for party 2 is . That is,
E = {ω ∈ Ω: w2(ac(ω,0), (ω,1))− w2(a0, (ω,1))= }× {1}.
The members of the set of events {E:  ∈ L2} ∪ {S − Ed} are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and therefore constitute a
partition of the state space. Any contract c can be amended in a way to make it a loss-dependent damages contract cˆ, by
restricting it to be measurable with respect to this partition. Thus cˆ may be speciﬁed as
cˆ(s) =
{
c(s) if s /∈ Ed
(a0, tcˆ()) if s ∈ Ed,
where tcˆ : R+ → [0,M] is a function relating the loss borne by party 2 to the associated damages payment from party 1.
Note that we do not require tcˆ() = . That is, the damages payment from party 1 to party 2 need not be equal to the loss
incurred by party 2. In typical cases, both parties will incur losses in default states, but party 2 (the ‘victim’ of default) will
incur greater losses, and the optimal payment from party 1 will produce a more even sharing of risk.
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the parties, the damages payment to party 2, tcˆ(), may be less than, equal to or greater than the loss  incurred by
party 2.4
The event E , however, may still be ambiguous. For example, the parties may disagree over what items should be counted
as losses arising from default and how they should be valued. Thus, such contracts are likely to, and regularly do, produce
disputes.
If losses are ambiguous, and dispute costs are high, parties may prefer a liquidated damages contract cˆ, with a speciﬁed
payment t˜ in the case of default:
c˜(s) =
{
c(s) if s /∈ Ed
(a0, t˜) if s ∈ Ed.
That is, either the contract c, applicable in the absence of default, is implemented or the default action a0 is undertaken
and party 1 pays to party 2 the liquidated damage sum t˜ . Since the event Ed is unambiguous, so is the liquidated damages
contract.
In general, there will be gains from risk sharing across states. When the aversion to ambiguity is small across states,
eﬃcient contracts will involve risk sharing even at the ambiguous default states. However, when the aversion to ambiguity
is suﬃciently large, there will be no risk sharing across default states and so all eﬃcient contracts will be liquidated damages
contracts. We formally give this result in the next proposition. For ease of exposition, we presume that the possibility of
dispute set D(s) is the same for each default state s ∈ Ed .
Proposition 1. Suppose that for all s ∈ Ed, D(s) = Ed. There is an α¯ < 1 such that: if αi > α¯ for each i ∈ {1,2}, then every ex ante
eﬃcient contract is a liquidated damages contract.
Proof. Suppose a contract c is not a liquidated damages contract. Then, let t denote the maximal payment over default
states under this contract, that is, t = maxs∈Ed tc(s), and let t denote the minimal payment over default states, that is,
t = mins∈Ed tc(s). Then, t > t . We will show that provided α¯ is large enough, we can increase the welfare of both parties 1
and 2 by marginally increasing t and marginally decreasing t .
For this, we deﬁne:
a = max
i∈{1,2}
max
s∈Ed
v ′i
(
wi(a0, s) − M
);
b = min
i∈{1,2}
min
s∈Ed
v ′i
(
wi(a0, s) + M
);
α¯ = a
a + b .
By assumption v ′i > 0 and v
′′
i < 0, hence it follows that a > b > 0. We assume in what follows that: αi > α¯ for each
i ∈ {1,2}. The ex ante expected utility of 1 can be written as:
V1(c) =
∑
s/∈Ed
πs v1
(
w1
(
c(s), s
)− tc(s))
+
∑
s∈Ed
πs
[
α1v1
(
w1(a0, s) − t
)+ (1− α1)v1(w1(a0, s) − t)].
We consider a marginal change to t and t such that dt = −dt > 0. For such a change:
dV1(c) =
∑
s∈Ed
πs
[
α1v
′
1
(
w1(a0, s) − t
)− (1− α1)v ′1(w1(a0, s) − t)]dt
>
(∑
s∈Ed
πs
)[
α¯b − (1− α¯)a]dt = 0,
with the strict inequality following from our deﬁnitions of a and b, and the properties v ′1 > 0 and v ′′1 < 0.
By similar reasoning for 2, we obtain dV2(c) > 0. Hence, c cannot be ex ante eﬃcient. 
4 In general, risk-sharing would imply that the damages payment should be less than the loss. In the model presented here, losses are the result of
force majeure rather than discretionary options. Hence, there is no incentive-based reason for exemplary or punitive damages. However, consideration of
the state-contingent preferences of party 1 suggests instances where risk-sharing may imply a payment larger than the loss. Suppose that high-losses to
party 2 occur when the good is in high demand and subject to constrained supply. Then party 1, having defaulted as a result of inability to supply on time,
may be able to sell the good at a high price and therefore (involuntarily) beneﬁt from default.
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damages contract. The intuition in the maximally pessimistic case (that is, αi = 1, for both i = 1,2) is as follows. Since each
expects the worst in default states, we can raise the utility of 2 at all default states by raising t , and simultaneously raise
the utility of 1 at all default states by lowering t . Since this change does not affect utility in any other state, it generates
a Pareto improvement. Proposition 1 shows that intuition carries through provided the parties are suﬃciently ambiguity
averse.
As mentioned in the introduction, this result is similar, in important respects, to that of Mukerji and Tallon (2001) who
demonstrated how probabilistic ambiguity about the idiosyncratic risk associated with ﬁnancial assets may deter agents
from trading such assets. In the analysis of Mukerji and Tallon, as in the decision-theoretic literature generality, ambiguity is
modeled as a property of individual beliefs, namely the absence of a well-deﬁned set of probabilities over states. By contrast,
in the present paper, individual beliefs over objective states of nature are taken to be probabilistically sophisticated. As in
the ordinary language use of the term, ambiguity arises in communication between the parties who may interpret the same
contractual terms to refer to different objective states of nature.
Our representation of contractual disputes shows that, from a modeling viewpoint, these apparently disparate notions
of ambiguity are in fact closely related. Since we have expressed linguistic ambiguity in terms of a dispute set with the
preferences over contracts represented by a Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) expected uncertain utility functional, our treatment
is mathematically equivalent to a party, after observing s ∈ S , having ‘maximally ambiguous beliefs’ about which s′ in the
dispute set D(s) will arise as a result of the other party’s interpretation of the situation. Hence, the mechanism behind the
suboptimal trading result of Mukerji and Tallon is the same mechanism behind our result. This analytical connection opens
the world of linguistic ambiguity to the intuitions and results of probabilistic ambiguity.
In the context of linguistic ambiguity, we have shown that suﬃcient (relative) aversion to ambiguity results in the parties
failing to exploit all risk sharing opportunities. This occurs because the parties expect any dispute arising from a default to
result in ex post litigation costs that burn up all surplus. By signing a ‘ﬂat’ liquidated damages contract, each party commits
ex ante to abstain from such behavior.
A natural question is whether or not a liquidated damages contract can be eﬃcient in a standard state-space approach
with contracting parties whose preferences conform to expected utility theory. The answer is that, in general, it cannot.
To see this, we presume that each player will have a partition over S × S and a probability distribution over those states.
Let ρi(s, s′) denote the prior probability in party i’s mind that party 1 sees s and party 2 sees s′ . Since we have assumed
non-default is unambiguous, it follows that
ρi
(
(ω,0),
(
ω′,1
))= ρi((ω,1), (ω′,0))= 0, for all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω.
So we shall focus on the event of default which we denote by the subset Ed ⊂ S × S given by Ed = {(s, s′): s, s′ ∈ Ed}.
Thus, the probability of a default event in the eyes of party i is
∑
(s,s′)∈Ed ρi(s, s
′). In keeping with our previous analysis,
each person’s wealth equivalent of an action depends only on the state each sees so when the state is (s, s′) we will write
w1(·, s) and w2(·, s′). However, we allow the transfer amount t to depend on the state (s, s′). The presumption here is that
some determination on (s, s′) will be made ex post and then a transfer occurs. Each player considers each contingency (s, s′)
as possible when he writes the contract. Under this scenario, the ex ante expected utilities of parties 1 and 2 restricted to
default states are respectively:
∑
(
s,s′
)∈Ed
ρ1
(
s, s′
)
v1
(
w1(a0, s) − t
(
s, s′
))
and
∑
(
s,s′
)∈Ed
ρ2
(
s, s′
)
v2
(
w2
(
a0, s
′)+ t(s, s′)).
Though typically liquidated damages will not be eﬃcient in this full state-space approach, for a clean result we focus on
a case of a common prior with a technical assumption about the richness of the state-space:
1. (Common prior) ρ1(s, s′) = ρ2(s, s′) > 0 for all (s, s′) ∈ Ed .
2. (Richness of State-space) There are s, s′ in Ed such that either w1(a0, s) = w1(a0, s′) or w2(a0, s) = w2(a0, s′).
Proposition 2. Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If c is ex ante eﬃcient, then c is not a liquidated damages contract.
Proof. Suppose c is a liquidated damages contract. By assumption 2, there are two default states s and s′ where some player
gets a different utility prior to any transfer. We assume, without loss of generality, that w1(a0, s) = w1(a0, s′). Consider the
states (s, s) and (s′, s) which are both in Ed . By assumption 1, a necessary condition for eﬃciency is:
v ′1(w1(a0, s) − tc(s, s))
v ′1(w1(a0, s′) − tc(s′, s))
= v
′
2(w2(a0, s) + tc(s, s))
v ′2(w2(a0, s) + tc(s′, s))
.
Since the contract is a liquidated damages contract, tc(s, s) = tc(s′, s), and so the right hand side of the equality must
be 1. However, since w1(a0, s) = w1(a0, s′) and v ′′1 < 0 (strict concavity), the left hand side cannot equal 1 when tc(s, s) =
tc(s′, s). Since c does not satisfy the necessary condition for eﬃciency, c is not eﬃcient. 
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We have provided a motivation for liquidated damages contracts in terms of linguistic ambiguity. Ambiguity can affect
incentives for risk sharing, and the desirability of contracts. In particular, ambiguity may in some cases be handled effectively
and eﬃciently by liquidated damages contracts.
The ambiguity in our model arises from multiple interpretations of the common language used to write contracts, as in
Grant et al. (2012a). However, contracting is modeled in a state-space with parties whose preferences can be derived from
the expected uncertain utility theory of Gul and Pesendorfer (2014), in a way that is formally equivalent to the probabilistic
ambiguity approach used in the analysis of Mukerji and Tallon (2001). Hence, this representation provides a link between
linguistic and probabilistic ambiguity.
The representation of ambiguity proposed here suggests new approaches to a range of issues in contract theory, and
potentially broader applications in agency theory. The standard principal–agent problem is one where contracting is limited
to some observable unambiguous characteristics like output, rather than a full set of characteristics, including effort levels,
which may be ambiguous. The framework developed here suggests the possibility of an endogenous choice between con-
tracts over different characteristics, where the choice of the contractual variables depends on the level of ambiguity and
potential gains from risk sharing. While this application would involve some new technical complications regarding the
appropriate treatment of tests, the beneﬁt would be the development of a theory of contracting in which the terms of the
contract, over which the parties actually bargain, plays the central role.
Appendix A. Relationship to expected uncertain utility theory
To see how the preferences over contracts of each party generated by the function given in Eq. (1) may be viewed as
having come from an expected-uncertain-utility decision-maker, recall that an expected-uncertain-utility decision-maker is
characterized by a prior and an interval utility. The prior comprises both an algebra of (measurable) events of the state-space
as well as a probability measure deﬁned on that algebra. For the prior of each party, we take the algebra E of (measurable)
events to be an algebra of subsets of the product state-space S × S generated from the partition
{{s} × D(s): s ∈ S}∪ {{s} × S\D(s): s ∈ S}.
Since each party presumes the other will see something within her or his own dispute set, the measure μ deﬁned on E
satisﬁes the following: for all s in S ,
μ
({s} × D(s))= πs and μ({s} × S\D(s))= 0.
For each party i = 1,2, we assume her interval utility function ui(x, x′), where x x′ , is additively separable and given
by ui(x, x′) = αi vi(x)+ (1−αi)vi(x′). Furthermore, we associate with each contract c : S → A the ‘act’ f ci : S × S →R, given
by
f ci
(
s, s′
)=
{
yi(c(s), s) if (∗) holds
yi(c(s′), s) otherwise,
where (∗) is said to hold if either
(i) y(3−i)
(
c(s), s′
)
> y(3−i)
(
c
(
s′
)
, s′
)
,
or
(ii) y(3−i)
(
c(s), s′
)= y(3−i)(c(s′), s′) and yi(c(s), s)> yi(c(s′), s).
Following expression (2) of Gul and Pesendorfer (2014, p. 1), we deﬁne the utility of an act f : S × S →R for party i to be
given by
Ui( f ) =
∫
u
([ f ]1, [ f ]2)dμ,
where [ f ]1 (respectively, [ f ]2) is the supremum (respectively, inﬁmum) of the set of acts measurable with respect to the
algebra E that are dominated by (respectively, dominate) f .
Using the expression for Vi(c) given in Eq. (1), by straightforward (albeit tedious) calculation we obtain: Vi(c) = Ui( f ci ),
for all contracts c in C .
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